By Hiroki Sugita,
Senior leaders of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have explained recent scandals in which 218 people were punished as having been caused by the SDF's "organizational culture."
Ryo Sakai, the chief of staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the service at the center of the scandals with revelations of fraud on an unprecedented scale, has resigned from his post, explaining that the organization was "structured in a way that it turned a blind eye to the fraud."
The roots of the problems with the SDF's organizational culture run deep. Simply punishing a large number of people, or replacing the top leadership, may not be enough to improve the situation.
One can think of insufficient diversity and deep-seated group thinking which excludes critical inputs, but lurking at the bottom is a lack of an appropriate level of alertness in the SDF.
The SDF has not fought a war in the 70 years since it was established. Japanese people tend to think the SDF's main task is not war, but relief for disaster victims.
As threats such as China and North Korea increase, the SDF is transforming itself into a military. Will the culture of the SDF improve from inertia to tension?
The current scandals are wide-ranging. Classified information on warship movements was available to SDF members who were not authorized to handle such secrets. There were also incidents of harassment of junior ranks and payments for duties that were not performed.
Four MSDF divers were arrested on charges of fraud. Illegal provision of money and goods to MSDF personnel on a daily basis by Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd., a major defense contractor, was also uncovered.
Of all the revelations, the most damaging were the unauthorized viewing of classified secrets and the relationship with Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
The classified secret system was introduced in 2014 at the request of the United States. The Japanese media reported information on Chinese submarines provided by the United States, and the United States, concerned about the leakage of the information and other secrets, requested Japan to establish the system as a condition for further defense cooperation.
Japan, which until then had no rigid system for handling classified information, enacted the Act on the Protection of Specified Secrets, which stipulates that only those who have passed a seven-point screening process, including criminal record and character checks, can handle classified secrets.
According to Japan's Defense Ministry, the personnel who had access to secrets without authorization were in the Combat Information Center, which handles such secrets, participating in conversations that included the secret information.
So far, there is no evidence that specified secrets have been leaked to China or other countries. The MSDF explains that the reason for the presence of the unauthorized personnel was that there were few qualified personnel available due to a shortage of manpower.
It has been 10 years since the specified secret system was launched. However, the operation of the system, in which even unauthorized personnel have been regularly in a position to view the secrets, shows that core members of the SDF did not understand the significance of the system and specified secrets.
Although the specified secret system is limited to military issues and defense, Japan will soon introduce a security clearance system that will be significantly expanded to include private-sector technicians from the economic security perspective.
If the same sloppy approach to managing secrets is extended to the private sector, the possibility of violations will increase.
The revelations that Kawasaki Heavy Industries provided money and goods to the MSDF submarine crew members stunned Japanese security circles.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which is contracted to build and repair ships for the MSDF, provided money and goods. Spending for this purpose totaled about 200 million yen a year, and over the past six years, it is said to have amounted to more than 1 billion yen.
These incidents could have a major impact on Japan's defense policy, under which the Japanese government has decided to beef up defense spending from 1 percent of gross domestic product to 2 percent and spend 43 trillion yen over a five-year period through fiscal 2027.
The government has been considering the timing of implementing tax hikes to achieve this goal, but after the SDF scandals were revealed, former Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera stated that he "strongly resents the state of the Self-Defense Forces in the midst of asking for an increased burden on the people."
If the public turns against the tax hike proposals, the defense spending increase will end up being a pipe dream.
With the war in Ukraine and the growing threat from China, Japan has strengthened defense cooperation not only with the United States but also with Australia, the Philippines and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries to a degree that was once unthinkable.
The liberal democratic camp, led by the United States, is promoting the concept of creating a global supply chain in terms of development, manufacturing, and maintenance of weapons. Japan's defense industry, with its high technological capabilities, will play a major role in this process.
Japan has just established a Defense Industry Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustenance Scheduling Agreement (DICAS) with the United States.
However, the revelations about the SDF and the Japanese defense industry could overshadow the future of such international cooperation.
Expectations for the SDF have continued to rise: a public opinion poll conducted by the Cabinet Office in 2022 showed that 91 percent hold a favorable impression of the SDF. Only 5 percent of respondents had a negative impression. Forty-two percent, meanwhile, called for an increase in the size of the SDF.
Public sentiment toward the SDF, which used to be an unwelcome presence in Japan, where anti-war sentiment is high, has changed dramatically.
However, when asked what the public expects the SDF to do, disaster relief tops the list and homeland defense comes second. When the SDF is mentioned, the first thing that comes to Japanese people's minds is relief efforts in the wake of natural disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake, not military organizations aimed at countering foreign threats.
If the public sees the SDF's main role as responding to natural disasters, it is understandable that the SDF has an "organizational culture" that does not rigidly control designated secrets with an eye on China with a sense of urgency.
The SDF will gradually change its organizational culture to one geared toward war. But in line with this, the Japanese public's expectations may also need to change.
The MSDF's way of announcing such grave scandals simultaneously has also been slammed, with critics saying it prevents them from individually receiving the level of attention they deserve.
A security policy maker and former senior member of the Ground Self-Defense Force said, "The simultaneous announcement of multiple incidents is a deliberate attempt to avoid prolonging the public's pursuit of the scandals."
This observation suggests that while a drastic change in the SDF's organizational culture looks difficult, given the security environment surrounding Japan, it is urgent.
(Hiroki Sugita is a visiting editorial writer at Kyodo News.)
